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China’s new rural income support policy:  





The impact of China’s new rural income support policy and recent price trends on grain 
production and rural income inequality is assessed for two villages with different degrees of 
market access in Northeast Jiangxi Province. Two village-level general equilibrium models 
are used to analyze household decision making and interactions between households within 
these villages. Parameter estimation and model calibration is based on data collected during 
an extensive survey held in these villages in the year 2000. The household classification used 
in these models allows us to draw conclusions that are relevant for many other villages and 
regions in China. Simulation results show that the income support policy does not reach its 
goal of promoting grain production. The increased incomes allow farm households to buy 
more inputs for livestock production, which is a more profitable activity. Moreover, because 
leisure is valued higher with increasing incomes, farmers tend to switch to less intensive rice 
production. Selling of rice outside the villages declines more than rice production due to the 
higher own consumption of households. We further find that agricultural tax abolition has a 
much larger impact on incomes and production than the direct income support in 2004. Both 
measures tend to reduce income inequalities within villages, because the richest household 
groups (who are more involved in off-farm employment) benefit less. Tax abolition, however, 
tends to widen income inequalities between villages, because the absolute income gain is 
much larger in relatively rich villages. The switch from rice production towards more 
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Since the beginning of 2004, the Government of the P.R. China has replaced its centuries-old 
policy of taxing agriculture by a new policy aimed at subsidizing agriculture and stimulating 
rural incomes.  To this end, agricultural taxes – standing at around 8 percent of agricultural 
incomes – were drastically reduced. By now they are abolished in most provinces. In addition, 
farmers growing grain receive a direct income subsidy, new seed varieties and mechanization 
are subsidized, and large public investments are made in agriculture and rural infrastructure. 
The main purpose of this policy is to raise rural incomes while at the same time promoting 
grain production (Gale et al. 2005).  
  During the first year of its introduction, the policy seems to have met with reasonable 
success. Per capita real annual net incomes of rural households increased by 6.85% in 2004, 
while the urban-rural income gap slightly decreased from 3.23 in 2003 to 3.20 in 2004 (NBS 
2005a: Tables 9-3 and 10-2). The population in absolute poverty in rural areas (with annual 
per capita net income below RMB 668) declined from 29.0 to 26.1 million in 2004 (NBS 
2005b). Total grain output increased by 9.0% to 469.5 million tons in 2004, after steadily 
declining from 512.3 to 430.7 million tons from 1998 to 2003 (NBS, 2005a: Table 13-17).  
  The rise in grain production was partly a result of the rapidly rising grain prices since 
October 2003 and favorable weather conditions in 2004. This raises the question to what 
extent the new rural income support policy has contributed to the increase in grain production 
and the rise in rural incomes, and to what extent other factors were responsible for these 
achievements. To analyze this question, we need to assess how farm households respond to 
rising grain prices and to the income support measures, under constant weather conditions. 
Farm household responses to price changes and income policy measures depend on the 
available resources within households for earning (on-farm or off-farm) incomes and on the 
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degree to which farm households are integrated into markets. The outcomes may therefore 
differ considerable between different groups of farm households and between different 
villages and regions. Insights into the groups that gain relatively more (or less) from the new 
rural income support measures, and the consequences for income inequality within rural 
areas, may provide important inputs into future policy making on reducing income gaps and 
avoiding social unrest.  
  The objective of this paper is therefore to examine farm household responses to recent 
price changes and the new rural income support measures and to assess the resulting effects 
on rural income inequality and grain production. To reach this objective, we run simulations 
with a village computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that is applied to two villages in 
Northeast Jiangxi Province. These villages differ fundamentally in their degree of market 
access. There is convincing empirical evidence that agricultural commodity markets in China 
have become highly integrated (Park et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2004). Transaction costs, 
however, differ considerably between villages with good market access and villages located 
in remote areas. Moreover, markets for production factors such as agricultural land, labor and 
credit face many institutional obstacles in China and remain underdeveloped in rural areas 
(Bowlus and Sicular, 2003; Zhang and Tan, 2004). These market imperfections have 
important implications for farm household choices between grain production and high value-
added production, and hence for the income gains of different household groups. Model 
simulations of the impact of price changes and income support measures for two villages with 
different market access conditions allows us to assess such differences in household 
responses, income gains, and grain production levels. The classification of households within 
these villages is based on the resources that they have for either earning agricultural incomes 
and for earning off-farm incomes. Insights obtained from such an analysis are relevant for 
many other villages and regions in China.        
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  The structure of the paper is as follows. Background information on the two villages and 
the method of data collection is provided in section 2. Section 3 describes the structure of the 
village CGE model and the scenarios that are used for the model simulations. Section 4 
presents and interprets the results of the model simulations, while section 5 summarizes the 
major conclusions.  
 
2. Description of the research sites 
 
The two villages selected for the study are Gangyan village in Yanshan County and 
Shangzhu village in Guixi City, both in Northeast Jiangxi province. Gangyan village is 
located in a plain area at about 20 km distance from the county capital. Almost all arable land 
(97%) in this village is irrigated. Shangzhu village is located in a remote and 
hilly/mountainous area close to the border with Fujian Province. Rice is the main crop in both 
villages, with most rice land in Gangyan producing two crops a year and most rice land in 
Shangzhu village producing only one crop per year. An extensive household survey, to collect 
all data necessary for building village social accounting matrices (SAMs) covering the year 
2000, was held in August 2000 and January 2001. A stratified random sample was used for 
selecting the households, with the hamlets (or ‘natural villages’) within each village forming 
the strata. In total, 168 households were interviewed in Gangyan village and 109 households 
in Shangzhu village, representing around 23% of the households in both villages.  
  Basic information on the two selected villages is presented in Table 1. Per capita income in 
the year 2000 was only 1,042 RMB (= $126) in Shangzhu village. In Gangyan village, it was 
78% higher. Rice yields in Shangzu village are about 15% below the yields in Gangyan 
village. Off-farm incomes are an important share of household incomes, contributing 45% and 
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41% of household incomes in Gangyan village and Shangzhu village, respectively. 
Agricultural tax payments make up around 4% of farm incomes.  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the two selected villages, year 2000 
 Gangyan  Shangzhu 
Households 730  472 
Sample size  168  109 
Accessibility  Close to city  Remote 
Land characteristics  Plain  97% upland 
Irrigated land per household (mu)  6.06  5.06 
Irrigated land / farmland  97%  86% 
One-season rice area / total rice area  18.5%  71.6% 




Rice yield (kg/ha)  4,629  3,950 
Fertilizer use in rice (kg/ha)   759  481 
Income per capita (RMB)  1,854  1,042 
Off-farm income share (%)  45.4  40.7 
Tax payments per household (RMB)  492  227 
Tax / household income (%)  5.9  5.0 
Agricultural tax per household (RMB)  382  186 
Agricultural tax / farm income (%)  4.5  3.8 




  Simulations of the impact of recent price changes and farm income support policy are 
made with a village-level CGE-model which allows for simultaneous decision making on 
production, consumption and labor supply by farm households. The model applies a macro-
level general equilibrium model structure, but is modified in such a way that the modeled 
household behavior is fully compatible with the rural household literature (Singh et al., 1986). 
Nonseparability of household decisions is build into the village-level equilibrium model using 
an approach suggested by Löfgren and Robinson (1999). The result is a hybrid village model 
that accounts for interactions among households within the village, while preserving 
individual rationality. The position of households in markets as net buyers, autarkic, or net 
sellers is made endogenous in the model through the use of mixed complementarity 
   6
constraints. Both the nonseparability of decision making and the endogeneity of the 
household position are departures from existing village models like those in Taylor and 
Adelman (1996).  
  Three commodity groups are distinguished in the model:  
•  Tradables: Are tradable outside the village; their prices are exogenous to the village.  
•  Village nontradables: Are tradable only within the village; their prices depend on demand 
and supply within the village. 
•  Household nontradables: Are not tradable; their (shadow) prices depend on demand and 
supply of the household.  
Data from the household survey and insights obtained during the fieldwork are used for 
classifying commodities. Traction services, agricultural labor and locally produced 
consumption goods are classified as village nontradables, while arable land, manure and crop 
residues and, in Shangzhu village, forest land and fuelwood, are household nontradables. All 
the other commodities in the model are tradables. Village prices for agricultural labor and 
locally produced consumption goods and are assumed to be fixed, resulting in demand-driven 
markets and non-zero profits; traction services is governed by an endogenous village price.
 
   Four household groups are distinguished in each village, based on the availability of 
resources for earning agricultural income and/or resources for earning off-farm income. The 
ownership of draught power (animals or tractors) was identified as the main resource for 
earning agricultural incomes in both villages. Explorative data analysis further indicates that 
the presence of a link outside the province (defined as the presence of a migrated household 
member or a relative sending remittances) is the most important resource for earning non-
agricultural incomes in Gangyan village, while in Shangzhu village it is the number of 
educated household members (defined as members with more than four years schooling).  
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Table 2. Classification of household groups in the two villages. 
 Household  group 
Village  1 2 3 4 
Owns draught power:  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Link outside province:  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Gangyan 
Number  of  households  18 23 59 68 
Owns draught power:    No  Yes  Yes 
Educated members  None  ≥ 1  1 or 2  ≥ 3 
Shangzhu 
Number  of  households  16 14 35 44 
 
  Table 2 shows the resulting classification. The four possible combinations of draught 
power ownership (yes/no) and presence of a link outside the province (yes/no) define the four 
groups in Gangyan village. In Shangzhu village, the first group consists of households with no 
educated household members; some of these households own draught power, others do not. 
The households with at least one educated household member are sub-divided into three 
groups. The first group consists of households owning no draught power, the second of 
households owning draught power and having one or two educated household members, 
while the last group consists of households owning draught power and having three or more 
educated members. Using this classification, a village SAM was constructed for each village. 
These SAMs were used for calibrating the village CGE model for each village.
1   
 
Table 3. Description of scenarios used in village model simulations 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Price changes  
2000-2004 
Rice:   +36.6% 
Pork:   −2.8% 
Fertilizer:   +13% 
CPI:   +4.9% 
Rice:   +36.6% 
Pork:   −2.8% 
Fertilizer:   +13% 
CPI:   +4.9% 
Rice:   +36.6% 
Pork:   −2.8% 
Fertilizer:   +13% 
CPI:   +4.9% 
Income support 
policy 
  10 Yuan per mu 
rice land 
Full abolishment of 
agricultural tax  
 
 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the structure of the model and the calibration of the model for Gangyan can be found 
in Kuiper, 2005 
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  Three scenarios are run with the models. They are described in Table 3. The first scenario 
assesses the impact of price changes from 2000 until August 2004.
2,3 Considerable price 
changes took place over that period in Jiangxi Province (and the rest of China). Rice prices 
initially declined somewhat, but increased rapidly since the autumn of 2003, resulting in a 
price increase of more than 35% over the entire period. Prices of fertilizers, the main variable 
input in crop production, increased by about 13% during the same period, while pork prices 
declined by almost 3%. The inflation rate (as measured by the consumer price index) was 
almost 5% during this period. The first scenario simulates the impact of these price changes 
on household incomes, production levels and input use. The second and third scenario add the 
two main components of the rural income support policy, direct subsidies to grain farmers and 
agricultural tax cuts, to the price changes simulated in scenario 1. Farmers in Jiangxi Province 
received a subsidy of 10 Yuan per mu in 2004 for each plot with early rice, late rice or one-
season rice (Gale et al., 2005: Table 2). The impact of this direct income support policy is 
simulated in scenario 2. Agricultural taxes have been cut in all provinces in China since the 
beginning of 2004 and were abolished in most provinces (including Jiangxi province) by the 
end of 2005. Scenario 3 simulates the impact of full tax abolition. By comparing the results 
for these three scenarios, we can separate household responses to the rapid price increases 
since the autumn of 2003 from the responses to the main new income support measures 
implemented in 2004 (under constant weather conditions).  
 
                                                 
2 This scenario is based on trends between 2000 and August 2004 for Jiangxi as whole. The authors would like to 
thank Nie Fengying of the CAAS Scientech Information and Documentation Center for providing us with the 
price data for Jiangxi Province.  
3 Model simulation runs with price trends until 2005, that have recently become available, will be presented at 
the IAAE Conference. 
   9
4. Simulation results 
  
The results for scenario 1 are shown in Tables 4 and 5. The income gains from the price 
changes from 2000 to 2004 are about two percentage points smaller in the remote village 
(Shangzhu) than in the village with good market access (Ganyan), as can be seen from Table 
4. In both villages, the household groups that possess resources for off-farm employment and 
have limited agricultural resources (group 3 in Gangyan and group 2 in Shangzhu), gain 
substantially less than the other three household groups. Since these are the richest groups in 
both villages, income inequality was reduced substantially by the price changes that occurred 
since 2000.  
 
Table 4. Income results for scenario 1 (Price change scenario) 
Village                Household group  1  2  3  4  Total 
Owns draught power:  No  Yes  No  Yes   
Link outside province:  No  No  Yes  Yes   
Income  2000  (RMB)  6,204 7,273 9,098 8,997 8,497 
Gangyan 
Increase  Aug.  2004  27.0% 33.4% 11.8% 24.0% 20.7% 
Owns draught power:    No  Yes  Yes   
Educated members  None  ≥ 1  1 or 2  ≥ 3   
Income  2000  (RMB)  2,861 6,409 5,114 4,969 4,891 
Shangzhu 
Increase Aug. 2004  21.1%  7.0%  24.6%  17.6%  18.5% 
 
 
  Table 5 shows the changes in production activities resulting from the price changes. In 
Gangyan, all four income groups expand their production of two-season rice at the expense of 
one-season rice, raising pigs and (to a lesser extent) growing other crops. Due to the 
intensification of rice cultivation, the demand for traction services increases and as a result the 
price of this village nontradable goes up by 57%. This explains why the two household groups 
possessing oxen and tractors gain relatively more than the two other household groups. In 
Shangzhu, on the other hand, rice production is strongly dominated by one-season rice, and 
expanding two-season rice is not a realistic option. The rapid price increase for rice therefore 
   10
causes a very significant increase in one-season rice production at the expense of perennials 
and pigs (and small livestock). The area of irrigated land is constant in the model (see above), 
so the increase in rice production comes purely from increased input use. The price of traction 
services increases by 16% in this village, which adds to the income gains of the households 
possessing oxen.  
 
Table 5. Production results for scenario 1 (Price change scenario) 
Village                  Household group  1  2  3  4  Total 
Owns draught power:  No  Yes  No  Yes   
Link outside province:  No  No  Yes  Yes   
One-season rice  −54  −72  −61  −73  −68 
Two-season  rice  23 39 34 39 36 
Other crops  −7  −9  −11  −11  −11 
Gangyan 
Pigs  −51  −79  −46  −55  −53 
Owns draught power:    No  Yes  Yes   
Educated members  None  ≥ 1  1 or 2  ≥ 3   
One-season  rice  58 132 95  90  91 
Two-season rice  4  −59  −53  −45  −42 
Other crops  −3  −4  −2  −22  −10 
Perennials  −69  −16  −83  −50  −61 
Shangzhu 
Pigs, chicken, ducks  −15  −48  −43  −43  −42 
Note: Data in table are percentage changes with respect to the base scenario 
 
  Scenario 2 simulates the combined impact of the direct income subsidy to grain farmers 
and the same price changes as in scenario 1. The direct income subsidy is paid in Jiangxi 
province on the basis of grain areas reported for taxation (Guo, 2005). It therefore adds to the 
incomes of rural households, but is not directly related to rice planting decisions. The 
simulation results of this scenario are compared with the outcomes of scenario 1. Table 6 
shows the impact on income and production activities. The policy has only a modest impact 
on incomes. The average income increase in Gangyan is 1.6% and in Shangzhu it is 1.3%. 
Again the richest household groups gain least from it, so the income support policy reduces 
inequality in both villages indeed.  
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Table 6. Income and production results for scenario 2 (Price change & direct 
income payment scenario) 
Village                Household group  1  2  3  4  Total 
Owns draught power:  No  Yes  No  Yes   
Link outside province:  No  No  Yes  Yes   
Household  income  2.1 2.1 1.0 1.7 1.6 
One-season  rice  2.0 2.2 1.0 1.8 1.6 
Two-season rice  −0.3  −0.2  −0.1  −0.2  −0.2 
Other crops  0.3  0.2  −0.3  0.4 0.1 
Gangyan 
Pigs 1.9  2.4  −0.3  4.5 1.5 
Owns draught power:    No  Yes  Yes   
Educated members  None  ≥ 1  1 or 2  ≥ 3   
Household  income  1.6 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 
One-season rice  −0.5  −0.1  −0.6  0.1  −0.2 
Two-season rice  0.3  −1.6  1.3 2.0 0.9 
Other  crops  0.9 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 
Perennials  −3.8  −0.1  1.0  −1.3  −0.7 
Shangzhu 
Pigs, chicken, ducks  1.3  −1.0  1.1 1.4 0.9 
Note: Data in table are percentage changes with respect to scenario 1 (price changes only) 
 
     Farm households in Gangyan respond to the income increase by raising more pigs 
(except for the richest group) and switching from two-season rice to one-season rice. Pigs 
production is intensive in the use of external inputs. The income increase means that farmers 
have more cash available, which they can use for buying such inputs. Moreover with the 
increase in wealth, households attach more value to leisure. The shadow price of labor 
increases 1.7 - 2.2 percent for household groups 1, 2 and 4, but only 0.9% for household 
group 3 (the richest group). The higher preference for leisure also induces farm households to 
switch to a less intensive way of rice cultivation. As a consequence, the direct income support 
policy does not reach one of its major goals, namely promoting grain production.  
  Households in Shangzhu also increase pigs production (except for the richest group), but 
their response is smaller and they do not seem to resort to less intensive rice cultivation. This 
may partly be explained from the smaller increase in the shadow price of labor, which equals 
0.8 – 1.3 percent for household groups 1, 3 and 4, and only 0.1% for household group 2.  
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Table 7. Income and production results for scenario 3 (Price change & tax  
abolition scenario) 
Village                Household group  1  2  3  4  Total 
Owns draught power:  No  Yes  No  Yes   
Link outside province:  No  No  Yes  Yes   
Household  income  16.5  14.8 7.4 11.0  10.7 
One-season  rice  15.3  15.6 7.3 11.9  11.1 
Two-season rice  −2.3  −1.8  −0.9  −1.2  −1.3 
Other crops  2.6  1.1  −2.4  2.4 0.7 
Gangyan 
Pigs 14.9  17.4  −2.2  29.0 9.9 
Owns draught power:    No  Yes  Yes   
Educated members  None  ≥ 1  1 or 2  ≥ 3   
Household  income  6.8 4.2 3.9 5.9 5.0 
One-season rice  −1.7  0.4  −0.5  −0.4  −0.4 
Two-season rice  1.3  −8.6  16.8 6.3  4.4 
Other  crops  4.3 3.5 0.4 3.5 2.3 
Perennials  −16.8  −0.8  3.8  −6.7  −3.8 
Shangzhu 
Pigs, chicken, ducks  5.5  −6.4  6.5 5.4 3.8 
Note: Data in table are percentage changes with respect to scenario 1 (price changes only) 
 
 
  The third scenario simulates the combined effect of the full tax abolition and the price 
changes (Table 7). Results are again compared with those of the first scenario. The results are 
very similar to those of scenario 2, but the magnitude is much larger. The average income 
increase in Gangyan is 10.7%, while in Shangzhu it is only 5.0%. The absolute income 
increase caused by tax abolition is much larger in Gangyan village (see Table 1), and the cash 
available for buying external inputs therefore increases much more. It also leads to a much 
larger increase in the shadow wage in Ganyan village (11% – 17% for groups 1, 2 and 4; 7% 
for group 3) than in Shangzhu village (3.3% – 4.3% for groups 1, 2 and 4; 0.9% for group 2). 
So, although income inequality within villages declines, the inequality between villages 
increases. One of the major goals of this policy, to reduce income inequality, is therefore only 
partially realized.  
  Table 8, finally, shows the changes in commodity flows going out of the two villages as a 
result of the two income support measures. The amounts of rice sold outside the village 
decreases in both villages under both scenarios. This is caused on the one hand by income-
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induced increases in rice consumption by households in the villages, and on the other hand by 
the lower production levels of two-season rice in Gangyan village and one-season rice in 
Shangzhu village (the two major crops in these villages). The switch from rice production to 
pigs production in Gangyan village causes an increase in pigs sold outside the village. In 
Shangzhu village, however, exports of all agricultural commodities decline.  
 
Table 8. Agricultural commodity exports from the villages 
Village                              Scenario  2  3 
Rice  −1.5  −10.7 
Other crops  −9.4  −67.2 
Gangyan 
Pigs 1.4  9.2 
Rice  −0.9  −3.0 
Other crops  0.0  0.0 
Perennials  −1.5  −7.3 
Shangzhu 
Pigs, chicken, ducks  −7.0  −42.2 
Note: Data in table are percentage changes with respect to  




Since the beginning of 2004, the Chinese government has adopted a new rural income support 
policy that is more in line with WTO regulations. Its major purpose is to address the growing 
income inequality in China, while at the same time promoting grain production and food self-
sufficiency. The two major measures taken in this respect are direct income support payments 
to grain farmers and abolition of agricultural taxes and fees paid by rural households. The 
results of the two village models discussed in this paper show that the policy does not reach 
its goal of promoting grain production; the large increase in grain production in 2004 was not 
caused by the income support policy but by the rapid price increases in 2003-2004. The 
increased incomes resulting from the new policy allow farm households to buy more inputs 
that can be used in livestock production. Moreover, because leisure is valued higher with 
increasing incomes, farmers tend to switch to less intensive grain production. Because own 
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grain consumption of households increases with higher incomes, the selling of rice outside the 
village declines even more than grain production.  
  We further find that tax abolition has a much larger impact on incomes and production 
than the direct income support (at around RMB 10 per mu) of 2004. Both measures tend to 
reduce income inequalities within villages, because the richest household groups (who are 
more involved in off-farm employment) benefit less. Tax abolition, however, tends to widen 
income inequalities between villages, because the absolute income gain is much larger in 
relatively rich villages. The switch towards more profitable activities like livestock production 
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